USDC (USDC)

@bax1337 @circle @jerallaire Only took 1 week to become relevant again https://t.co/7Bst6NPqzn

The $280 million was transferred via Circle’s network over a six‑hour period, and Circle was not the subject of criticism. 'Do the right thing': establishing a freezing mechanism, responding to law‑enforcement requests, and taking appropriate actions – that part was correct. 'Do things right': the process should be efficient and automated, which was not done. For Circle, upgrading the response process as a result of this incident is essential. Freezing too aggressively and too quickly is also detrimental in many scenarios; moderation is important.

Drift got exploited for $285 million. Over half their TVL wiped in a single attack. The worst part isn't the hack. It's Circle watching stolen $USDC move through their own bridge and doing nothing. Same company that froze a legitimate business wallet last week without hesitation. So Circle can freeze your funds instantly over a civil dispute but can't freeze stolen money during an active exploit. That tells you everything about how the "freeze authority" actually works. And once again the industry learns that "decentralised" doesn't mean "secure."

Latest fee structure of @Polymarket is here. The largest prediction market will soon be one of the largest onchain protocol by revenue, not just volume. This would also upset a large number of pro traders who’ve been minting on arbs, thin spreads and near market outcomes.

The ~$270M @DriftProtocol exploit roughly happened like this: 1- An attacker created a synthetic token and pushed its valuation close to ~$8B 2- Two governance multisig wallets were compromised and this token was approved as collateral 3- The attacker used this collateral to borrow almost every major asset inside the protocol 4- Borrowed assets were withdrawn across multiple wallets Stolen assets are shown below ↓ The important part here is what this attack was not. This was not a smart contract bug. This was not an oracle manipulation. This was not a flash loan exploit. The protocol itself worked exactly as designed. The failure happened at the governance layer. The attacker did not break Drift. They obtained permission inside Drift. And this distinction matters more than people think. Because when security assumptions fail at the multisig level, the entire system becomes vulnerable regardless of how strong the contracts are. We have already seen this pattern multiple times: Ronin Bybit Cetus Now Drift Different chains. Same root cause. This is not a Solana issue. This is a coordination and key management issue across DeFi. Most protocols are still structurally secure at the code level but fragile at the approval layer. And until that changes, multisig governance will remain one of the largest hidden attack surfaces in the ecosystem.

Over $270 million drained from Drift Protocol It appears the multisig was compromised via a social engineering attack. Circle is also facing criticism for delaying the freezing of USDC for six hours. Watching the AI agents perform real-time threat analysis really drives home the point that human judgment is the biggest bottleneck.

Larry Fink said that at $150 oil the chances of a recession are 100%. In that scenario, the efficiencies @CantonNetwork and @circle create for the economy will be even harder to ignore. In downturns institutions prioritize liquidity, cost and counterparty risk. Canton improves the rails, enabling faster settlement and collateral movement between institutions. Circle improves the money layer, programmable digital dollars that move globally 24/7. Better rails + better cash matter more when markets tighten. But it will likely follow in 3 phases 👇 Phase 1: Risk-off crash Phase 2: infrastructure winners emerge Phase 3: institutional rails get valued $CC $CRCL

$USDC $USDT $CRCL Yuan or Stables Hormuz Toll booth